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Response
Colin Hottman
Within the economic development discourse, few ideas have been as
contested as the “Washington Consensus.” It is widely considered to
be both synonymous with neo-liberalism and hegemonic within the
discourse. By placing the Washington Consensus within a historical
context, Professor Kanbur shows that it emerged as a response to the
statist development consensus of the 1950s–1970s. Several important
lessons can be drawn from this circumstance. First, each distinct period
of development policy, both the early state-directed policies and later
the Washington Consensus, were promoted by economists and international financial institutions at the time. Second, the economic development discourse is event driven. Third, the new economic development
consensus differs fundamentally from previous prescriptions since it is
not “one size fits all.” Each of these lessons will be covered in Section
II of this essay.
While it does provide significant insight into the origins and meanings of the Washington Consensus, Professor Kanbur’s account of the
evolution of the economic development discourse is not without its
shortcomings. His categorization of development policies within a
Left-Right policy space leads him to emphasize the political overtones
of the events driving the economic policy discourse, rather than discuss the progression of economic development theory. Additionally,
by focusing on the political content of the economic development discourse, rather than on the particular spaces from which it originates,
Kanbur’s account does not tell us anything about the public and private spaces within and around the institutions of global economic governance from which the discourse originates. These limitations will be
covered in Section III of my article.
Section IV discusses a perspective on development that raises some
interesting questions for Dr. Kanbur and the new economic development consensus. I articulate the view that development is about the
advancement of human freedom and that all countries face unique
institutional constraints. I use these two concepts to highlight the
importance of two neglected issues in development policy: immigration and state failure. Section V concludes the essay.
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*****
Emerging after the birth of macroeconomics and the industrialization
of the Soviet Union, the early postwar development approach naturally
favored state intervention as the means to spur development in the
Third World. Many government advisors in Third World nations were
trained in the First World, and it was with the strong support of First
World economists and global institutions (such as the World Bank)
that Third World countries engaged in state-directed industrialization.
The first lesson to learn is that throughout each phase of development
policy, during both the early state-directed policies and later the Washington Consensus, the policies implemented were those championed
by prominent economists and international financial institutions. This
is important to keep in mind, especially given Kanbur’s account of
why the fashionable development polices have changed over time.
Kanbur’s explanation is that the economic development discourse is
event driven. This is the second important lesson to learn. Starting in
the 1970s, and intensifying in the 1980s, events like the OPEC oil shocks
and the collapse of the Soviet Union cast doubt upon the efficacy of
government planning in both the First and the Third World. Add to
this the emergence of the East Asian “tigers,” who offered a model of
export-oriented development, and it is easy to understand how doubt
could start to plague the early statist development consensus. The
responsiveness of the economic development discourse to worldwide
events highlights the fact that “the Theory of Economics…is a method
rather than a doctrine…a technique of thinking, rather than a body of
settled conclusions.”1 This is important to bear in mind, especially for
those critics of the Washington Consensus who conflate the economics
discipline with market fundamentalism.
The third useful lesson is that the new “Washington Confusion”2
differs fundamentally from previous development prescriptions. Both
the statist development consensus of the 1950s–1970s and the Washington Consensus of the 1980s–1990s were “one size fits all.”3 The
new economic development consensus, as characterized by Kanbur,
is not a generic formula. It stresses the importance of country-specific
characteristics and of experimenting with growth strategies. While
he acknowledges that some critics consider the new consensus to be
unfocused, Kanbur prefers to emphasize the recent inclusion of distributional concerns and the benefits of a broader perspective. The key
point is that this new consensus is formed around the idea that there
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is no one set of economic policies that constitute universally sufficient
conditions for economic development.
*****
Professor Kanbur’s account of the evolution of the economic development discourse is not flawless. His placement of development policies
on a political spectrum leads him to focus on the political nature of
the events driving the economic policy discourse, at the cost of considering the parallel development of economic theory. For example,
while the change from the early statist development consensus to the
Washington Consensus was indeed partly driven by specific historical
events, it was also a result of the shift in development economics from
early models based mainly on savings to additional insights, such as
the importance of institutions. Of course, the development of economic
theory is itself an endogenous, dialectical process, but it is also a lens
through which historical events are interpreted. By even weakly associating development policies with political ideologies, this sort of classification makes it easy to forget that the real lesson we have learned
over the past fifty years is that neither end of the policy spectrum is
universally correct. Promoting development is not so easy.
By focusing on the changing content of the economic development
discourse, Kanbur is able to situate the Washington Consensus within
a particular historical moment. Such an approach ignores important
questions regarding the public and private spaces from which the discourse originates. Do “Ministry of Finance types” still hold a hegemonic position within these spaces? In what ways does the nature of
these spaces shape the forms that contestation can take? Have decision-making processes within the institutions of global economic
governance changed within the last fifty years? Do such institutions
approach the implementation of development policy differently now
than in the past?
These questions have significant implications for the effectiveness
of development policy that are separate from questions regarding the
ideological content of said policies. For example, Joseph Stiglitz argues
that proper sequencing and pacing of reforms is vital to their success.4
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*****
Now I will discuss a view of development that raises some challenging questions for Kanbur and the new Washington Confusion. First,
I will explain a simple but powerful model from Djankov and colleagues5 that provides insight into the problems with one-size-fits-all
policy prescriptions and will also be helpful in explaining some of the
issues highlighted by my human-freedom conception of development.
In this model, institutions function to control the trade-off between the
costs of dictatorship and the costs of disorder. The costs of dictatorship
generally consist of the risk of expropriation of citizens by a predatory
state, while the costs of disorder consist of the risk of expropriation
of citizens by private agents. Each country has a specific set of institutional possibilities, with the set representing a continuum of possible institutional arrangements ranging from a centralized command
economy to anarchy. Moving along the continuum involves trading
off the costs of dictatorship with the costs of disorder. The total costs
of dictatorship and disorder are functions of what Djankov et al. call
“civic capital.” This civic capital is a function of the culture’s degree
of trust in strangers, ethnic homogeneity, the society’s level of human
capital, the degree of equality, and the country’s physical environment,
among other factors. Generally speaking, countries with a high degree
of civic capital have lower costs of dictatorship and disorder. However, cross-country differences in the composition of civic capital can
lead to variability in the costs of dictatorship relative to the costs of
disorder in the various countries. Those institutional arrangements
within the institutional possibilities set that minimize the total costs
of dictatorship and disorder are the efficient institutional choice. One
way to look at the new consensus in economic development policy is
to notice that, given this model of the effects of institutions, there will
not be a universally optimal choice of institutional arrangement across
countries due to differences in each country’s endowment and composition of civic capital. Thus, when formulating a development strategy,
it is important to take into account country-specific characteristics and
initial conditions. Countries face institutional constraints as a result of
their culture and history. Given such constraints, certain changes, such
as rapid reforms shrinking the size of the state, may be very costly in
terms of the costs of disorder. It depends entirely upon the country in
question and its features.
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Abstracting from particular countries, development has historically been conceived as a temporal process in which different countries
experience similar effects. One potential effect, or marker, or even definition of development is an increase in economic growth. An alternative definition of development is improvements in social indicators,
such as child malnutrition. In defining development, “there is liable to
be a competitive struggle to get one’s own definition accepted. Those
who struggle, wishing to influence policy, are right to do so. If a definition gets accepted, it tends to deemphasize considerations not included
in the definition.”6
I propose that development is about the advancement of human
freedom. Prominent economists have advocated such an approach to
evaluating economic development. As Arthur Lewis argued in The
Theory of Economic Growth, “The advantage of economic growth is not
that wealth increases but that it increases the range of human choice…
economic growth increases man’s freedom.”7 Peter Bauer wrote that he
considers “the extension of the range of choice…as the principal objective and criterion of economic development.”8 However, no development economist has written more thoughtfully or convincingly on this
approach than Amartya Sen. In Development as Freedom, Sen writes
that, “in this approach, expansion of freedom is viewed as both (1) the
primary end and (2) the principal means of development.”9 An expansion
of the freedom of individuals is “the expansion of the ‘capabilities’ of
persons to lead the kind of lives they value.”10 The concept of capabilities includes “being able to avoid such deprivations as starvation…as
well as the freedoms that are associated with being literate…enjoying
political participation and uncensored speech,” the freedom to choose
commodity baskets and engage in market exchange, and enjoying protective security from poverty.11
I think that such an individual-level focus is crucial when formulating development policy. This contrasts with the widely held conception of development within the economic development discourse, one
based on economic growth and national economic policy objectives.
The typical approach, based on measuring development using aggregate national statistics, reifies the nation-state and obscures changes in
individual capabilities. As Friedrich Hayek noted in his Nobel Memorial Lecture, “while in the physical sciences the investigator will be able
to measure what, on the basis of a prima facie theory, he thinks important, in the social sciences often that is treated as important which
happens to be accessible to measurement.”12 Furthermore, unlike the
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physical sciences, the social sciences have to deal with structures of
organized complexity and, therefore, Hayek argues that we cannot
“replace the information about the individual elements by statistical
information.”13 The human-freedom approach to development thus
may not be practically measurable and might be dismissed by some
critics as unscientific. Setting aside the premise that development is
inherently normative, the individual-freedom approach to development is valuable because it provides important lessons for policymakers. The individual-freedom conception of development directly leads
to innovative development policies that challenge the reified nationstate. Two prominent examples include the issues of immigration and
state failure.
Despite its position on capital mobility, the Washington Consensus
was never associated with advocating the free mobility of labor. The
new Washington Confusion appears to also be silent on the issue as
well. Within the development-as-human-freedom approach, relaxing
immigration controls directly constitutes development, since it values
an individual’s capability to choose where to live. This seems to have
been lost in the debate on immigration reform in the United States.
From the perspective of the individual-freedom approach, the United
States is directly preventing development. Mexican immigrants should
be allowed access to the U.S. labor market. Additionally, the movement
of labor out of countries with weak institutions may in fact be the easiest way to increase development for their populations.14 It is just not
clear that every nation-state is capable of producing development.
This leads to the second issue, that of state failure. Within the economic development discourse, state failure is treated mostly as something to be prevented or reversed. This is the result of reifying the
state. Development is widely considered to be almost impossible
without some state institutions. The development-as-human-freedom
approach differs from the conventional approach on the implications
of state failure.
Consider the case of Somalia, which has been in a condition of anarchy since 1991. Using event study methodology comparing human
development indicators in Somalia for 1985–1990 with those for 2000–
2005, Peter Leeson found that fourteen of the eighteen human development indicators have improved in the years since the state collapsed.
For example, the percentage of one-year-olds fully immunized against
TB increased from 31% to 50%, while the infant mortality rate per 1,000
dropped from 152 to 114.89.15 The percentage of the population with
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access to at least one healthcare facility rose from 28% to 54.8%, while
the percentage of the population living in extreme poverty fell from
60% to 43.2%. To the extent that the changes in these human development indicators reflect actual improvements in peoples’ capabilities,
they represent development. In Somalia’s case, Leeson argues that the
collapse of the predatory Somali state actually led to the increased provision of private law and order—and with it increased development.
Powell and colleagues use a comparative institutional approach and
find that their results agree with Leeson’s conclusions. Somalia’s standard of living has improved since the state collapsed.16
Using the costs of dictatorship and disorder model discussed previously, Somalia has specific conditions that define its institutional
choice. The country went from having some level of government with
very high costs of dictatorship and low costs of disorder to having no
government, with the resultant costs of disorder being less than the
costs of dictatorship that would be incurred at any level of government.
Now, as conditions in Somalia change, the costs of dictatorship and
disorder that Somalia faces regarding particular institutional arrangements will change. It may result in the efficient institutional choice
becoming some form of central government. At this time, however,
Somalia is unable to obtain relatively cheap government in terms of the
costs of dictatorship and disorder. Thus, foreign state-building interventions into Somalia are counterproductive.17 In a new assessment,
Peter Leeson and Claudia Williamson argue that, “allowing total state
collapse in the poorest parts of the developing world—those countries
in which complete government failure and the emergence of anarchy
is most imminent—may actually be the most promising avenue for
improving the social welfare of the citizens in these countries.”18
*****
The development policy discourse has changed dramatically in the
last decades. There are three important lessons to draw from Professor Kanbur’s account of the changes in the discourse. The first lesson
is that each distinct wave of development policy, both the early statedirected policies and the Washington Consensus, were recommended
by the economists and international financial institutions at the time.
The second lesson is that the economic development discourse is event
driven. After the events of the 1990s, the Washington Consensus lost
its hegemonic position. Related to this, the third lesson is that the new
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Washington Confusion differs fundamentally from previous development prescriptions since it is not a one-size-fits all paradigm.
There are two limitations to Professor Kanbur’s account of the historical evolution of the economic development discourse. First, his
view of development policies with a political lens puts the focus on the
political nature of the events framing the economic policy discourse,
instead of on the advancement of economic theory. Second, by focusing on the political content of the economic development discourse,
rather than on the particular spaces from which it originates, Kanbur’s
account does not reveal anything regarding the public and private
spaces within and around the institutions of global economic governance from which the discourse originates.
Even though the new economic development consensus is not a onesize-fits-all development paradigm, it still centers around states as the
appropriate actors and on national economic growth as the appropriate measure for development. While this new development consensus
is not intrinsically in conflict with the individual-freedom approach or
the idea that all countries face unique institutional constraints, conventional development policy generally neglects the issues of immigration
and state failure. While I am critical of the prevailing view of these two
issues, I am confident that increases in individual freedom over time
will lead to improvements in the human condition.
Notes
1. Rostow 1962.
2. See Naim 2000.
3. Jagdish Bhagwati considers this to be a “silly critique” (Bhagwati 2005).
4. Stiglitz 2002.
5. Djankov et al. 2003.
6. Little 1982.
7. Srinivasan 1994.
8. Bauer 1957.
9. Sen 1999.
10. Ibid.
11. Additional capabilities that highlight the advantage of using the development-ashuman-freedom approach include the ability to enjoy the environment and to avoid
becoming a victim of violence. (Sen 1999).
12. Hayek 1978.
13. Ibid.
14. This is exactly the argument made by Lant Pritchett (2006).
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15. Leeson 2007.
16. Powell et al. 2008. For further evidence of the costs of predatory government and the
areas of Somalia’s improvement since state collapse, see Nenova 2004, and Nenova and
Harford 2004.
17. For a discussion of the difficulties of rebuilding failed states through interventions
with reference to Somalia, see Coyne 2008.
18. Leeson and Williamson 2008.
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